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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-430 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES ET ux. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[May , 1983] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
Although I join JUSTICE STEVENS' dissenting opinion and 
agree with him that the warrant is invalid even under the 
Court's newly announced "totality of the circumstances" test, 
see post, at 4-5, and n. 8, I write separately to dissent from 
the Court's unjustified and ill-advised rejection of the two-
prong test for evaluating the validity of a warrant based on 
hearsay announced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), 
and refined in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 
I 
The Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as 
reflected by today's unfortunate decision, patently disre-
gards Justice Jackson's admonition in Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949): 
"[Fourth Amendment rights] ... are not mere sec-
ond-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispens-
able freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so 
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of 
the individual and putting terror in every heart. U n-
controlled search and seizure is one of the first and most 
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary gov-
ernment .... 
"But the right to be secure against searches and sei-
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zures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the 
officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no en-
forcement outside of court." !d., at 180-181 (Jackson, 
J. , dissen tin g). 
In recognition of the judiciary's role as the only effective 
guardian of Fourth Amendment rights, this Court has devel-
oped over the last half century a set of coherent rules govern-
ing a magistrate's consideration of a warrant application and 
the showings that are necessary to support a finding of prob-
able cause. We start with the proposition that a neutral and 
detached magistrate, and not the police, should determine 
whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of a 
warrant. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948), 
the Court stated: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection 
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime. . . . When the right of 
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as 
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a police-
man or government enforcement agent." ld., at 13--14 
(footnote omitted). 
See also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971); 
Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 415; United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 109 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 
supra, at 111; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 270-271 
(1960); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486 
(1958); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464 (1932) . . 
In order to emphasize the magistrate's role as an independ-
ent arbiter of probable cause and to insure that searches or 
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seizures are not effected on less than probable cause, the 
Court has insisted that police officers provide magistrates 
with the underlying facts and circumstances that support the 
officers' conclusions. In Nathanson v. United States, 290 
U. S. 41 (1933), the Court held invalid a search warrant that 
was based on a customs agent's "mere affirmation of suspi-
cion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting 
facts ." I d., at 46. The Court stated that "[Xu]nder the 
Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a war-
rant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable 
cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him 
under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or sus-
picion is not enough." I d., at 4 7. 
In Giordenello v. United States, supra, the Court re-
viewed an arrest warrant issued under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure based on a complaint sworn to by a Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics agent. I d., at 481. 1 Based on the 
agent's testimony at the suppression hearing, the Court 
noted that "until the warrant was issued ... [the agent's] 
suspicions of petitioner's guilt derived entirely from informa-
tion given him by law enforcement officers and other persons 
in Houston, none of whom either appeared before the Com-
missioner or submitted affidavits." I d., at 485. The Court 
found it unnecessary to decide whether a warrant could be 
based solely on hearsay information, for the complaint was 
"defective in not providing a sufficient basis upon which a 
finding of probable cause could be made." Ibid. In par-
ticular, the complaint contained no affirmative allegation that 
the agent spoke with personal knowledge nor did it indicate 
1 Although the warrant was issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the Court stated that "[t]he provisions of these Rules must be 
read in light of the constitutional requirements they implement." 
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 485 (1958). See Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 112, n. 3 (1964). ("The principles announced in 
Giordenello derived ... from the Fourth Amendment, and not from our 
supervisory power"). 
81-430-DISSENT 
4 ILLINOIS v. GATES 
any sources for the agent's conclusion. I d., at 486. The 
Court expressly rejected the argument that these deficien-
cies could be cured by "the Commissioner's reliance upon a 
presumption that the complaint was made on the personal 
knowledge of the complaining officer." Ibid. 
As noted, the Court did not decide the hearsay question 
lurking in Giordenello. The use of hearsay to support the 
issuance of a warrant presents special problems because in-
formants, unlike police officers, are not regarded as presump-
tively reliable or honest. Moreover, the basis for an infor-
mant's conclusions are not always clear from an affidavit that \ s 
merely reports those conclusions. If the conclusory allega-
tions of a police officer are insufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause, surely the conclusory allegations of an infor-
mant should a fortiori be insufficient. 
In Jones v. United States, supra, the Court considered 
"whether an affidavit which sets out personal observations 
relating to the existence of cause to search is to be deemed 
insufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the affi-
ant's observations but those of another." 362 U. S., at 269. 
The Court held that hearsay information can support the is-
suance of a warrant "so long as a substantial basis for credit-
ing the hearsay is presented." Ibid. The Court found that 
there was a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay in-
volved in Jones. The informant's report was based on the 
informant's personal knowledge, and the informant previ-
ously had provided accurate information. Moreover, the in-
formant's story was corroborated by other sources. Finally, 
the defendant was known to the police to be a narcotics user. 
!d., at 271. 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), merely made ex-
plicit what was implicit in Jones. In considering a search 
warrant based on hearsay, the Court reviewed Nathanson 
and Giordenello and noted the requirement established by 
those c·ases that an officer provide the magistrate with the 
underlying facts or circumstances that support the officer's 
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conclusion that there is probable cause to justify the issuance 
of a warrant. The Court stated: 
"The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great as 
in Nathanson and Giordenello. Here, the 'mere conclu-
sion' that petitioner possessed narcotics was not even 
that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified 
informant. The affidavit here not only 'contains no affir-
mative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal 
knowledge of the matters contained therein,' it does not 
even contain an 'affirmative allegation' that the affiant's 
unidentified source 'spoke with personal knowledge.' 
For all that appears, the source here merely suspected, 
believed or concluded that there were narcotics in peti-
tioner's possession. The magistrate here certainly 
could not 'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the 
facts relied on . . . to show probable cause.' He neces-
sarily accepted 'without question' the informant's 'suspi-
cion,' 'belief' or 'mere conclusion."' I d., at 113--114 
(footnote omitted). 2 
While recognizing that a warrant may be based on hearsay, 
the Court established the following standard: 
"[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the un-
derlying circumstances from which the informant con-
cluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they 
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from 
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose 
2 The Court noted that approval of the affidavit before it "would open 
the door to easy circumvention of the rule announced in Nathanson and 
Giordenello." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 114, n. 4. The Court stated: 
"A police officer who arrived at the 'suspicion,' 'belier or 'mere conclusion' 
that narcotics were in someone's possession could not obtain a warrant. 
But he could convey this conclusion to another police officer, who could 
then secure the warrant by swearing that he had 'received reliable in-
formation from a credible person' that the narcotics were in someone's pos-
session." Ibid. 
6 
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identity need not be disclosed . . . was 'credible' or his 
information 'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from 
the facts which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 
'by a neutral and detached magistrate,' as the Constitu-
tion requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime' 
... or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant." 
/d., at 114-115 (footnote omitted). 
The Aguilar standard was refined in Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli, the Court re-
viewed a search warrant based on an affidavit that was "more 
ample," id., at 413, than the one in Aguilar. The affidavit in 
Spinelli contained not only a tip from an informant, but also a 
report of an independent police investigation that allegedly 
corroborated the informant's tip. Ibid. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Court stated that it was "required to delin-
eate the manner in which Aguilar's two-pronged test should 
be applied. . . . " Ibid. 
The Court held that the Aguilar test should be applied to 
the tip, and approved two additional ways of satisfying that 
test. First, the Court suggested that if the tip contained 
sufficient detail describing the accused's criminal activity it 
might satisfy Aguilar
s basis of knowledge prong. ld., at 
416. Such detail might assure the magistrate that he is "re-
lying on something more substantial than a casual rumor cir-
culating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on 
an individual's general reputation." Ibid. Although the tip 
in the case before it did not meet this standard, "[t]he detail 
provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 
U. S. 307 (1959), provide[d] a suitable benchmark," ibid., be-
cause "[a] magistrate, when confronted with such detail, 
could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his in-
formation in a reliable way." !d., at 417 (footnote omitted).3 
3 There is some tension between Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959), and Aguilar. In Draper, the Court considered the validity of a 
81-430-DISSENT 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 7 
Second, the Court stated that police corroboration of the 
details of a tip could provide a basis for satisfying Aguilar. 
I d., at 417. The Court's opinion is not a model of clarity on 
this issue since it appears to suggest that corroboration can 
satisfy both the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs of 
warrantless arrest based on an informant's tip and police corroboration of 
certain details of the tip. The informant, who in the past had always given 
accurate and reliable information, told the police that Draper was peddling 
narcotics. The informant later told the police that Draper had left for Chi-
cago by train to pick up some heroin and would return by train on the 
morning of one of two days. The informant gave the police a detailed 
physical description of Draper and of the clothing he was wearing. The 
informant also said that Draper would be carrying a tan zipper bag and 
that he walked very fast. 358 U. S., at 309. 
On the second morning specified by the informant, the police saw a man 
"having the exact physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing de-
scribed by [the informant], alight from an incoming Chicago train and start 
walking 'fast' toward the exit." !d., at 309-310. The man was carrying a 
tan zipper bag. The police arrested him and searched him incident to the 
arrest. Ibid. 
The Court found that the arrest had been based on probable cause. 
Having verified every detail of the tip "except whether [Draper] had ac-
complished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or 
in his bag," id., at 313, the police "had 'reasonable grounds' to believe that 
the remaining unverified bit of [the informant's] information ... was like-
wise true." Ibid. 
There is no doubt that the tip satisfied Aguilar
s veracity prong. The 
informant had given accurate information in the past. Moreover, under 
Spinelli, the police corroborated most of the details of the informant's tip. 
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S., at 417; id., at 426-427 (WHITE, J., 
concWTing); infra, at , and n. 4. There is some question, however, 
about whether the tip satisfied Aguilar
s basis of knowledge prong. The 
fact that an informant is right about most things may suggest that he is j 
credible, but it does not establish that he has acquired his information in a 
reliable way. See Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 426-427 (WHITE, 
J., concurring). Spinelli's "self-verifying detail" element resolves this 
tension. As one commentator has suggested, "under Spinelli, the Draper 
decision is sound as applied to its facts." Note, The Informer's Tip As 
Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 958, 964, n. 34 
(1969). 
8 
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AJXLOar. I d., at 417-418. 4 JUSTICE WHITE's concurring 
op1mon, however, points the way to a proper reading of the 
Court's opinion. After reviewing the Court's decision in 
Draper v. United States, supra, JUSTICE WHITE concluded 
that "[t]he thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have 
independent significance with respect to proof of [another un-
verified fact]." !d., at 427. In his view, "[t]he argument in-
stead relates to the reliability of the source: because an infor-
mant is right about some things, he is more probably right 
about other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts." 
Ibid. JUSTICE WHITE then pointed out that prior cases had 
rejected "the notion that the past reliability of an officer is 
sufficient reason for believing his current assertions." Ibid. 
JUSTICE WHITE went on to state: 
"Nor would it suffice, I suppose, if a reliable informant 
4The Court stated that the FBI's independent investigative efforts 
could not "support both the inference that the informer was generally 
trustworthy and that he had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis 
of infonnation obtained in a reliable way." Spinelli v. United States, 
supra, at 417. The Court suggested that Draper again provided "a rele-
vant comparison." Ibid. Once the police had corroborated most of the 
details of the tip in Draper "[i]t was . . . apparent that the informant had 
not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth; since the report was of 
the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been 
obtained in a reliable way, it was perfectly clear that probable cause had 
been established." I d., at 417-418. 
It is the Court's citation of Draper which creates most of the confusion. 
The informant's credibility was not at issue in Draper irrespective of the 
corroboration of the details of his tip. See n. 3, supra. The Court's opin-
ion, therefore, might be read as suggesting that corroboration also could 
satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge test. I think it is more likely, how-
ever, especially in view of the discussion infra, at , that the Court sim-
ply was discussing an alternative means of satisfying Aguilar's veracity 
prong, using the facts of Draper as an example, and relying on its earlier 
determination that the detail of the tip in Draper was self-verifying. See 
393 U. S., at 416-417. It is noteworthy that although the affiant in 
Spinelli had sworn that the informer was reliable, "he [had] offered the 
magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion." I d., at 416. 
Aguilar's veracity prong, therefore, was not satisfied. Ibid. 
81-430--DISSENT 
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states there is gambling equipment in Apartment 607 
and then proceeds to describe in detail Apartment 201, a 
description which is verified before applying for the war-
rant. He was right about 201, but that hardly makes 
h1m more believable about the equipment in 607. But 
what if he states that there are narcotics locked in a safe 
in Apartment 300, which is described in detail, and the 
apartment manager verifies everything but the contents 
of the safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics 
is made appreciably more believable by the verification. 
The informant could still have gotten his information 
concerning the safe from others about whom nothing is 
known or could have inferred the presence of narcotics 
from circumstances which a magistrate would find unac-
ceptable." I d., at 427. 
I find this reasoning persuasive. Properly understood, 
therefore, Spinelli stands for the proposition that corrobora-
tion of certain details in a tip may be sufficient to satisfy the 
veracity, but not the basis of knowledge, prong of Aguilar. 
As noted, Spinelli also suggests that in some limited circum-
stances considerable detail in an informant's tip may be ade-
quate to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of Aguilar.5 
Although the rules drawn from the cases discussed above 
are cast in procedural terms, they advance an important un-
derlying substantive value: Findings of probable cause, and 
5 After concluding that the tip was not sufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause, the Court stated: 
"Th is not to say that the tip was so insubstantial that it could not prop-
erly have counted in the magistrate's determination. Rather, it needed 
some further support. When we look to the other parts of the application, 
however, we find nothing alleged which would permit the suspicions en-
gendered by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime 
was probably being committed." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S., at 
418. 
The Court went on to suggest that corroboration of incriminating facts 
would be needed. See ibid. 
10 
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attendant intrusions, should not be authorized unless there is 
some assurance that the information on which they are based 
has been obtamed m a reliable way by an honest or credible 
person. As applied to police officers the rules focus on the 
way in which the information was acquired. As applied to 
mform.ants, the rules focus both on the honesty or credibility ) 
of the informant and on the reliability of the way in which the 
mformatwn was acquired. Insofar as it is more complicated, 
an evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay involves a more 
difficult inquiry. This suggests a need to structure the in-
quiry in an effort to insure greater accuracy. The standards 
announced in Aguilar, as refined by Spinelli, fulfill that 
need. The standards inform the police of what information 
they have to provide and magistrates of what information 
they should demand. The standards also inform magistrates 
of the subsidiary findings they must make in order to arrive 
at an ultimate finding of probable cause. Spinelli, properly 
understood, directs the magistrate's attention to the possibil-
ity that the presence of self-verifying detail might satisfy 
Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong and that corroboration of 
the details of a tip might satisfy Aguilar's veracity prong. 
By requiring police to provide certain crucial information to 
magistrates and by structuring magistrates' probable cause 
inquiries, Aguilar and Spinelli assure the magistrate's role 
as an independent arbiter of probable cause, insure greater 
accuracy in probable cause determinations, and advance the 
substantive value identified above. 
Until today the Court has never squarely addressed the 
application of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips from 
anonymous informants. Both Aguilar and Spinelli dealt 
with tips from informants known at least to the police. See 
also, e. g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972); 
United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 575 (1971); Whiteley 
v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 565 (1971); McCray v. Illinois, 386 
U. S. 300, 302 (1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 
268-269 (1960). And surely there is even more reason to 
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subject anonymous informants' tips to the tests established 
Y guil ar and Spinelli. By definition nothing is known 
about an anonymous mformant's identity, honesty, or reli-
a ility. One commentator has suggested that anonymous in-
formants should be treated as presumptively unreliable. 
See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Proba-
ble Cause: Reconciling The Spinelli!Draper Dichotomy in Il-
linois v. Gates, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 99, 107 (1982). See 
also Adams v. Williams, supra, at 146 (suggesting that an 
anonymous telephone tip provides a weaker case for a Terry 
stop than a tip from an informant known to the police who 
had provided information in the past); United States v. Har-
ris, supra, at 599 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("We cannot as-
sume that the ordinary law-abiding citizen has qualms about 
[appearing before a magistrate]"). In any event, there cer-
tainly is no basis for treating anonymous informants as pre-
sumptively reliable. Nor is there any basis for assuming 
that the information provided by an anonymous informant 
has been obtained in a reliable way. If we are unwilling to 
accept conclusory allegations from the police, who are pre-
sumptively reliable, or from informants who are known, at 
least to the police, there cannot possibly be any rational basis 
for accepting conclusory allegations from anonymous 
informants. 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 
To suggest that anonymous informants' tips are subject to 
the tests established by Aguilar and Spinelli is not to sug-
gest that they can never provide a basis for a finding of prob-
able cause. It is conceivable that police corroboration of the 
details of the tip might establish the reliability of the infor-
mant under Aguilar's veracity prong, as refined in Spinelli, 
and that the details in the tip might be sufficient to qualify 
under the "self-verifying detail" test established by Spinelli 
as a means of satisfying Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong. 
The Aguilar and Spinelli tests must be applied to anonymous 
informants' tips, however, if we are to continue to insure that 
findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, are 
12 
81-430--DISSENT 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 
based on info ti i . rma tion provided by an honest or credible per-
son who has acquired the information in a reliable way 6 
I.n light of the important purposes served by Aguilar and 
Spinelli, I would not reject the standards they establish. If 
anything, I simply would make more clear that Spinelli, 
properly understood, does not depart in any fundamental 
way from the test established by Aguilar. For reasons I 
shall next state, I do not find persuasive the Court's justifica-
tions for rejecting the test established by Aguilar and refined 
by Spinelli. 
6 As noted, supra, at , Aguilar and Spinelli inform the police 
of what information they have to provide and magistrates of what informa-
tion they should demand. This advances the important process value, 
which is intimately related to substantive Fourth Amendment concerns, of 
having magistrates, rather than police, or informants, determine whether 
there is probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant. We want the 
police to provide magistrates with the information on which they base their 
conclusions so that magistrates can perform their important function. 
When the police rely on facts about which they have personal knowledge, 
requiring them to disclose those facts to magistrates imposes no significant 
burden on the police. When the police rely on information obtained from 
confidential informants, requiring the police to disclose the facts on which 
the informants based their conclusions imposes a more substantial burden 
on the police, but it is one that they can meet because they presumably 
have access to their confidential informants. 
In cases in which the police rely on information obtained from an anony-
mous informant, the police, by hypothesis, cannot obtain further infonna-
tion from the informant regarding the facts and circumstances on which the 
informant based his conclusion. When the police seek a warrant based 
solely on an anonymous informant's tip, therefore, they are providing the 
magistrate with all the information on which they have based their conclu-
sion. In this respect, the command of Aguilar and Spinelli has been met 
and the process value identified above has been served. But Aguilar and 
Spinelli advance other values which argue for their application even to 
anonymous informant's tips. They structure the magistrate's probable 
cause inquiry and, more importantly, they guard against findings of proba-
ble cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything other than informa-
tion which magistrates reasonably can conclude has been obtained in a reli-
able way by an honest or credible person. 
81-430-DISSENT 
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In rejecting the A il . . 
gests that a "tot Aguilar-Spinelli standards, the Court sug-
more C t a I Y of the circumstances approach is far onsis ent with than i . . our prior treatment of probable cause 
s. any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by 
every Informant's tip." Ante, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). 
In support of this proposition the Court relies on several 
cases that purportedly reflect this approach, ante, at 15, n. 6, 
17, n. 7, and on the "practical, nontechnical," ante, at 16, na-
ture of probable cause. 
Only one of the cases cited by the Court in support of its 
"totality of the circumstances" approach, Jaben v. United 
States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), was decided subsequent to 
Aguilar. It is by no means inconsistent with Aguilar.7 
The other three cases 8 cited by the Court as supporting its 
7 In Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), the Court considered 
whether there was probable cause to support a complaint charging peti-
tioner with willfully filing a false tax return. I d., at 221. After reviewing 
the extensive detail contained in the complaint, id., at 223, the Court ex-
pressly distinguished tax offenses from other types of offenses: 
"Some offenses are subject to putative establishment by blunt and concise 
factual allegations, e. g., 'A saw narcotics in B's possession,' whereas 'A 
saw B file a false tax return' does not mean very much in a tax evasion 
case. Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion 
has been committed often requires a reconstruction of the taxpayer's in-
come from many individually unrevealing facts which are not susceptible of 
a concise statement in a complaint. Furthermore, unlike narcotics infor-
mants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect, the sources in 
this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy 
information. Thus, whereas some supporting information concerning the 
credibility of informants in narcotics cases or other common garden variet-
ies of crime may be required, such information is not so necessary in the 
context of the case before us." I d., at 223-224. 
Obviously, Jaben is not inconsistent with Aguilar and involved no general 
rejection of the Aguilar standards. 
8 Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964); Ker v. California, 
374 U. S. 23 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). 
14 
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totality of th . 
A il e Circumstances a . h 
guilar. In any event it . pproac were decided before 
cussion of them ' I Is apparent from the Court's dis-
inconsistent with' sAee ante, at 17-18, n. 7, that they are not 
I . . guilar. 
n addition, one can d h 
tical non technic l" conce e t at probable cause is a "prac-Aguilar and S IC.a c?ncept without betraying the values that 
A .l pinelli reflect. As noted see supra at --guilar and s in ll" ir ' ' ' t . pinel i reqmre the police to provide magis-
rates with certain crucial information. They also provide 
structure for magistrates' probable cause inquiries. In so 
dOI.ng, Aguilar and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates 
as Independent arbiters of probable cause, insure greater ac-
curacy In probable cause determinations, and advance the
substantive value of precluding findings of probable cause, 
and attendant intrusions, based on anything less than in-
formation from an honest or credible person who has ac-
quired his information in a reliable way. Neither the stand-
ards nor their effects are inconsistent with a "practical, 
nontechnical" conception of probable cause. Once a magis-
trate has determined that he has information before him that 
he can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by 
a credible person, he has ample room to use his common 
sense and to apply a practical, nontechnical conception of 
probable cause. 
It also should be emphasized that cases such as Nathanson 
v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933), and Giordenello v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 480 (1958), discussed supra, at 
--, directly contradict the Court's suggestion, ante, 
at 18, that a strong showing on one prong of the Aguilar test 
should compensate for a deficient showing on the other. If 
the conclusory allegations of a presumptively reliable police 
officer are insufficient to establish probable cause, there is no 
conceivable reason why the conclusory allegations of an anon-
ymous informant should not be insufficient as well. More-
over, contrary to the Court's implicit suggestion, Aguilar 
and Spinelli do not stand as an insuperable barrier to the use 
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37 ° ju icial determinations of probable cause. . .. " 8 U. S., at 111. In Spinelli the Court noted that it was 
not retreating from the proposition that magistrates' deter-
minations of probable cause "should be paid great deference 
by reviewing courts. . .. " 393 U. S., at 419. It is also 
noteworthy that the language from United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 108--109 (1965), which the Court re-
peatedly quotes, see ante, at 20, 21, and n. 10, brackets the 
following passage, which the Court does not quote: 
"This is not to say that probable cause can be made out 
by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only 
the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable cause 
exists without detailing any of the 'underlying circum-
stances' upon which that belief is based. See Aguilar v. 
Texas, supra. Recital of some of the underlying circum-
stances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to 
perform his detached function and not serve merely as a 
rubber stamp for the police. However, where these cir-
cumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the 
source of the information is given, and when a magis-
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The Court also argues that "[i]f the affidavits submitted by police offi-
cers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appro-
priate, police nught well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of 
re.lymg on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that 
nnght develop at the time of the search." Ante, at 21. If the Court is 
suggesting, as it appears to be, that the police will intentionally disregard 
the law, it need only be noted in response that the courts are not helpless to 
deal with such conduct. Moreover, as was noted in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971): 
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' The excep-
tions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by 
those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made 
that course imperative.' '[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption 
to show the need for it."' I d., at 454-455 (plurality opinion) (footnotes 
omitted). 
It therefore would appear to be not only inadvisable, but also unavailing, 
for the police to conduct warrantless searches in "the hope of relying on 
consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop 
at the time of the search." Ante, at 21. 
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findings of probable cause are based on information that a 
magistrate can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable 
way by an honest or credible person. I share JUSTICE 
White's fear that the Court's rejection of Aguilar and 
Spinelli and its adoption of a new totality of the circum-
stances test, ante, at 23, "may foretell an evisceration of the 
probable cause standard .... " Ante, at 26 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in the judgment). 
III 
The Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive rea-
son for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly reflects im-
patience with what it perceives to be "overly technical" rules 
governing searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Words such as "practical," "nontechnical," and "com-
monsense," as used in the Court's opinion, are but code 
words for an ove is iv ttitude towards police prac-
tices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth 
Amendment. Everyone shares the Court's concern over the 
horrors of drug trafficking, but under our Constitution only 
measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be 
employed by government to cure this evil. We must be ever 
mindful of Justice Stewart's admonition in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), that "[i]n times of unrest, 
whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal 
subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents 
may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the 
values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitu-
tional concepts." I d., at 455 (plurality opinion). In the 
same vein, Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942), 
warned that "[s]teps innocently taken may, one by one, lead 
to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties." 
/d., at 86. 
Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are particularly 
difficult to protect because their "advocates are usually crimi-
nals." Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 314 (1959) 
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(Douglas J d is in. ' ., issenting). But the rules "we fashion [are] for 
the Innocent and guilty alike." Ibid. See also Kolender v. 
Lawson, . U. S. , (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concur-
rmg); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 181 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). By replacing Agui lar and Spinelli 
Wlth a test that provides no assurance that magistrates, 
rather than the police, or informants, will make determina-
tions of probable cause; imposes no structure on magistrates' 
probable cause inquiries; and invites the possibility that in-
trusions may be justified on less than reliable information 
from an honest or credible person, today's decision threatens 
to "obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions be-
tween our form of government, where officers are under the 
law, and the police-state where they are the law." Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 17 (1948) . 
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